Post-Election Nuke Standoff Likely to Enter New Phase

Two years have passed since the second North Korean nuclear crisis erupted but the six-party talks to resolve the standoff have stalled ahead of the U.S. presidential election.
On the occasion of the 54th anniversary of its foundation, The Korea Times here considers the future course of the nuclear impasse and examines the background of the policies of the countries involved in the issue. _ ED.

By Ryu Jin
Staff Reporter

Bush or Kerry? With the end of the U.S. presidential race near at hand, the North Korean nuclear crisis is reaching a crossroads. The outcome of the election, which will set the tone for U.S. foreign policy over the next five years, will have a significant influence in determining whether a peaceful solution can be found or the crisis continues to escalate.

Many experts and opinion leaders in South Korea, including former President Kim Dae-jung, say the Nov. 2 poll may determine the fate of the Korean peninsula for the next four years.

For South Korea, whose concern over the North’s nuclear programs clearly is at least equal to that of neighboring nations, the next leader of the United States is a matter of enormous importance.

Taking into account the development of the first nuclear crisis a decade ago, different combinations of South Korean and U.S. administrations have forged different stances in their united front, thereby resulting in distinct pictures in the diplomatic impasse.

A New Combination?

In the early 1990s when the first nuclear crisis was about to surface, the government of then South Korean President Roh Tae-woo had been softer toward the North, then ruled by Kim Il-sung, than the U.S. administration of George H. W. Bush. Despite the small differences, however, the allies could reach a considerable degree of consensus in dealing with the communist regime because they shared a common containment policy.

The partners saw new governments at almost the same time in early 1993, with the start of the Kim Young-sam government in South Korea and the Bill Clinton administration in the U.S. Under the new administrations, Washington softened while Seoul got tougher.

When South Korea in 1998 saw the entrance of a new administration led by Kim Dae-jung, famous for his ``sunshine policy,’’ it appeared the two nations were drawing nearer, both engaging the North in dialogue. But discord returned after a brief period when George W. Bush took power in 2001, branding North Korea as part of an ``axis of evil.’’

Different combinations brought about different game plans, as shown by the format of negotiations: in the first nuclear crisis, Clinton focused on two-way direct talks with the North, while the junior Bush has favored a multilateral format to address the second crisis.

By the time Roh Moo-hyun took office in February 2003, taking over the task of inter-Korean reconciliation as initiated by his predecessor, a dissonance had already developed between the allies of half a century.

Indeed, Seoul officials have suffered great difficulties in calming the American hawks, who did not even rule out a preemptive attack on Pyongyang to frustrate its nuclear ambitions.

Now the Roh government, as well as the North Koreans led by Kim Jong-il, are waiting for the results of the crucial U.S. poll, which may create a new combination of negotiating partners.

A Crucial Poll

The recent campaign in the U.S. in the lead-up to the Nov. 2 election has revealed major differences in foreign policy between Bush, who is seeking another four-year term, and the challenger Kerry.

Some say there will be no big difference regardless of who wins the presidency because of the changed international climate, epitomized by the so-called war on terrorism, a by-product of the Sept. 11 attacks on the U.S. in 2001.

``Whoever wins the poll, there would be no major change in U.S. foreign policy, which is focusing on efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials and technology,’’ Han Sung-joo, Seoul’s ambassador to the U.S., said.

``If President Bush is reelected, there is the distinct possibility that the U.S. will push for a new round of six-party talks right after the election,’’ he said. ``If Kerry wins, the next round of talks may come a bit later, but it won’t take long for his administration to craft its own North Korea policy as the Democrats gained important experience during the Clinton administration.’’

When it comes to method, however, there are significant differences, experts say.

Unlike Bush, who sees the Kim Jong-il regime as a ``rogue state’’ that can never be treated as a responsible dialogue partner, Kerry has said he will engage with the North in active bilateral talks to end the standoff.

For the North, bullied endlessly by Bush’s unilateralism, Kerry’s U.S. will certainly be an easier match. But, at the same time, a Kerry administration would also seek to forge a united front with other countries in the region, given the Democrat’s concern about allies and partners.

Bush’s reelection, however, would not necessarily mean the situation would deteriorate further. While focusing on Iraq, the Bush administration has kept tension on the peninsula from reaching a critical point.

In that sense, many experts say, it was clever for Bush to employ the tactic of managing the crisis by drawing China, which has long acted as the North’s ``Big Brother,’’ to the negotiating table.

But if Bush obtains another four years in office, some things will change. He is expected to push ahead in earnest with the controversial Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), aimed at training troops to intercept weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) at sea.

``North Korea, Iran and Syria, among others, are clearly states of proliferation concern,’’ U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, leading the hawkish group of neo-cons in the Bush administration, said last Wednesday during a visit to Tokyo.

Seoul has been reluctant to participate in the PSI, in which about 20 nations have already pledged to take part, for fear of provoking Pyongyang. But a second-term Bush may press South Korea hard to join, while putting more pressure on the North.

Though the U.S. would not launch a preemptive attack unless North Korea takes a serious step, such as a nuclear test, the dilemma is that hard-line U.S. policy could drive the North to such extremes.

A South Korean Way to Go

During the first crisis, there was little ground upon which Seoul could stand as the Clinton administration pursued two-way, direct talks with the North, armed with its notorious tactic of ``brinkmanship.’’

But the second crisis has developed differently. Calling the 1994 pact a failed deal, Bush insisted on a multilateral dialogue format despite the North’s severe opposition. And so the six-party talks came into being.

The changed format has given Seoul much more room for mediating between Pyongyang and Washington. At first, North Korea told the South, ``It’s none of your business,’’ but the isolated country began to realize its southern brethren could be quite useful in facing the tough hawks from across the Pacific.

``They even expressed gratitude in informal gatherings for our role as an active mediator in the six-party talks,’’ a Seoul diplomat involved in the negotiations told The Korea Times. ``Instead of just being a good arbitrator, we’ve also made creative suggestions ourselves.？？p> Now Seoul is bracing itself for another possible change in the nuclear dispute as the U.S. election draws near.

``We’ve been studying future strategies, taking into account possible changes after the U.S. election,’’ another Seoul delegate said. ``It is a bit early to say, but if Kerry wins, many things will change, not only in the U.S. approach but also in the lineup of its negotiation team.’’

While Kerry’s administration could be helpful for finding a new breakthrough, the official said the role of other parties could be reduced since the U.S, would focus on direct talks with the North.

``One thing that won’t change, however, is that South Korea will keep playing an active role, regardless of the outcome of the election,’’ he added. ``Cooperation between Seoul and Washington will become more important to overcome the challenge.’’

Pyongyang’s Strategic Resolution

Despite all these possible scenarios, it would be a big mistake to simply believe that a Kerry victory would bring an easy conclusion to the long journey of establishing a nuclear-free peninsula, experts say.

Having experienced an unprecedented terror attack on its soil, the top priority of the U.S. in its foreign policy became counter-terrorism and nonproliferation of WMD.

Kerry might employ some methods that Bush has not, but the confrontation cannot be bought to an end unless the North gives up its nuclear ambitions. So the one holding the key to a peaceful solution is none other than the North.

``Given the fact that the Democrats have traditionally put an emphasis on human rights issues, we cannot rule out the possibility that Kerry’s administration would be stricter with North Korea,’’ Kim Tae-woo, a researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), said.

Cho Tae-yong, South Korea’s deputy chief delegate to the six-party talks, said there are currently three important points, regardless of who wins the U.S. election. First, the framework of the six-party dialogue will be maintained. Second, the U.S. will continue to give priority to resolving the nuclear crisis. And finally, it will demand that the North give up all of its nuclear programs, including the one based on highly enriched uranium.

``North Korea will be urged more to make a strategic decision as the involved parties move to find a solution,’’ he said.

jinryu@koreatimes.co.kr