I Have Risked My Life, To Tell You The Truth
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작성자 최고관리자 작성일14-03-09 20:13 조회5,676회 댓글0건관련링크
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I Have Risked
My Life, To Tell You The Truth
By Edward Snowden
In January
2014, the Civil Liberties (LIBE) Committee of the European Parliament voted to
invite Edward Snowden to testify to the long running inquiry on electronic mass
surveillance. Snowden’s testimony has now been published. Unlike Snowden’s
previous brief statement to the inquiry, this new evidence includes answers to
specific questions posed by members of the LIBE Committee.
In his
evidence, Snowden reiterates that he is limiting his comments to topics that
have already been reported on. He also repeats hs “willingness to provide
testimony to the United States Congress, should they decide to consider the
issue of unconstitutional mass surveillance.”
March 08, 2014 / Information Clearing House
I would like to thank the European Parliament
for the invitation to provide testimony for your inquiry into the Electronic
Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens. The suspicionless surveillance programs of
the NSA, GCHQ, and so many others that we learned about over the last year
endanger a number of basic rights which, in aggregate, constitute the
foundation of liberal societies.
The first principle any inquiry must take into account is that
despite extraordinary political pressure to do so, no western government has
been able to present evidence showing that such programs are necessary. In the
United States, the heads of our spying services once claimed that 54 terrorist
attacks had been stopped by mass surveillance, but two independent White House
reviews with access to the classified evidence on which this claim was founded
concluded it was untrue, as did a Federal Court.
Looking at the US government's reports here is valuable. The most
recent of these investigations, performed by the White House's Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board, determined that the mass surveillance program
investigated was not only ineffective – they found it had never stopped even a
single imminent terrorist attack – but that it had no basis in law. In less
diplomatic language, they discovered the United States was operating an
unlawful mass surveillance program, and the greatest success the program had
ever produced was discovering a taxi driver in the United States transferring
$8,500 dollars to Somalia in 2007.
After noting that even this unimpressive success – uncovering
evidence of a single unlawful bank transfer – would have been achieved without
bulk collection, the Board recommended that the unlawful mass surveillance
program be ended. Unfortunately, we know from press reports that this program
is still operating today.
I believe that suspicionless surveillance not only fails to make
us safe, but it actually makes us less safe. By squandering precious, limited
resources on "collecting it all," we end up with more analysts trying
to make sense of harmless political dissent and fewer investigators running
down real leads. I believe investing in mass surveillance at the expense of
traditional, proven methods can cost lives, and history has shown my concerns
are justified.
Despite the extraordinary intrusions of the NSA and EU national
governments into private communications world-wide, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
the "Underwear Bomber," was allowed to board an airplane traveling
from Europe to the United States in 2009. The 290 persons on board were not
saved by mass surveillance, but by his own incompetence, when he failed to
detonate the device. While even Mutallab's own father warned the US government
he was dangerous in November 2009, our resources were tied up monitoring online
games and tapping German ministers. That extraordinary tip-off didn't get
Mutallab a dedicated US investigator. All we gave him was a US visa.
Nor did the US government's comprehensive monitoring of Americans
at home stop the Boston Bombers. Despite the Russians specifically warning us
about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the FBI couldn't do more than a cursory investigation
– although they did plenty of worthless computer-based searching – and failed
to discover the plot. 264 people were injured, and 3 died. The resources that
could have paid for a real investigation had been spent on monitoring the call
records of everyone in America.
This should not have happened. I worked for the United States'
Central Intelligence Agency. The National Security Agency. The Defense
Intelligence Agency. I love my country, and I believe that spying serves a
vital purpose and must continue. And I have risked my life, my family, and my
freedom to tell you the truth.
The NSA granted me the authority to monitor communications
world-wide using its mass surveillance systems, including within the United
States. I have personally targeted individuals using these systems under both
the President of the United States' Executive Order 12333 and the US Congress'
FAA 702. I know the good and the bad of these systems, and what they can and
cannot do, and I am telling you that without getting out of my chair, I could
have read the private communications of any member of this committee, as well
as any ordinary citizen. I swear under penalty of perjury that this is true.
These are not the capabilities in which free societies invest.
Mass surveillance violates our rights, risks our safety, and threatens our way
of life.
If even the US government, after determining mass surveillance is
unlawful and unnecessary, continues to operate to engage in mass surveillance,
we have a problem. I consider the United States Government to be generally
responsible, and I hope you will agree with me. Accordingly, this begs the
question many legislative bodies implicated in mass surveillance have sought to
avoid: if even the US is willing to knowingly violate the rights of billions of
innocents – and I say billions without exaggeration – for nothing more
substantial than a "potential" intelligence advantage that has never
materialized, what are other governments going to do?
Whether we like it or not, the international norms of tomorrow are
being constructed today, right now, by the work of bodies like this committee.
If liberal states decide that the convenience of spies is more valuable than
the rights of their citizens, the inevitable result will be states that are
both less liberal and less safe. Thank you.
I will now respond to the submitted questions. Please bear in mind
that I will not be disclosing new information about surveillance programs: I
will be limiting my testimony to information regarding what responsible media
organizations have entered into the public domain. For the record, I also repeat
my willingness to provide testimony to the United States Congress, should they
decide to consider the issue of unconstitutional mass surveillance.
– Rapporteur Claude Moraes MEP, S&D Group:
Given the focus of this Inquiry is on the impact of mass surveillance
on EU citizens, could you elaborate on the extent of cooperation that exists
between the NSA and EU Member States in terms of the transfer and collection of
bulk data of EU citizens?
A number of memos from the NSA's Foreign Affairs Directorate have
been published in the press.
One of the foremost activities of the NSA's FAD, or Foreign
Affairs Division, is to pressure or incentivize EU member states to change
their laws to enable mass surveillance. Lawyers from the NSA, as well as the
UK's GCHQ, work very hard to search for loopholes in laws and constitutional
protections that they can use to justify indiscriminate, dragnet surveillance
operations that were at best unwittingly authorized by lawmakers. These efforts
to interpret new powers out of vague laws is an intentional strategy to avoid
public opposition and lawmakers’ insistence that legal limits be respected,
effects the GCHQ internally described in its own documents as "damaging
public debate."
In recent public memory, we have seen these FAD "legal
guidance" operations occur in both Sweden and the Netherlands, and also
faraway New Zealand. Germany was pressured to modify its G-10 law to appease
the NSA, and it eroded the rights of German citizens under their constitution.
Each of these countries received instruction from the NSA, sometimes under the
guise of the US Department of Defense and other bodies, on how to degrade the
legal protections of their countries' communications. The ultimate result of
the NSA's guidance is that the right of ordinary citizens to be free from
unwarranted interference is degraded, and systems of intrusive mass
surveillance are being constructed in secret within otherwise liberal states,
often without the full awareness of the public.
Once the NSA has successfully subverted or helped repeal legal
restrictions against unconstitutional mass surveillance in partner states, it
encourages partners to perform “access operations.” Access operations are
efforts to gain access to the bulk communications of all major telecommunications
providers in their jurisdictions, normally beginning with those that handle the
greatest volume of communications. Sometimes the NSA provides consultation,
technology, or even the physical hardware itself for partners to
"ingest" these massive amounts of data in a manner that allows
processing, and it does not take long to access everything. Even in a country
the size of the United States, gaining access to the circuits of as few as
three companies can provide access to the majority of citizens' communications.
In the UK, Verizon, British Telecommunications, Vodafone, Global Crossing,
Level 3, Viatel, and Interoute all cooperate with the GCHQ, to include
cooperation beyond what is legally required.
By the time this general process has occurred, it is very
difficult for the citizens of a country to protect the privacy of their
communications, and it is very easy for the intelligence services of that
country to make those communications available to the NSA – even without having
explicitly shared them. The nature of the NSA's "NOFORN," or NO
FOREIGN NATIONALS classification, when combined with the fact that the
memorandum agreements between NSA and its foreign partners have a standard
disclaimer stating they provide no enforceable rights, provides both the NSA
with a means of monitoring its partner's citizens without informing the
partner, and the partner with a means of plausible deniability.
The result is a European bazaar, where an EU member state like
Denmark may give the NSA access to a tapping center on the (unenforceable)
condition that NSA doesn't search it for Danes, and Germany may give the NSA
access to another on the condition that it doesn't search for Germans. Yet the
two tapping sites may be two points on the same cable, so the NSA simply
captures the communications of the German citizens as they transit Denmark, and
the Danish citizens as they transit Germany, all the while considering it
entirely in accordance with their agreements. Ultimately, each EU national
government's spy services are independently hawking domestic accesses to the
NSA, GCHQ, FRA, and the like without having any awareness of how their
individual contribution is enabling the greater patchwork of mass surveillance
against ordinary citizens as a whole.
The Parliament should ask the NSA and GCHQ to deny that they
monitor the communications of EU citizens, and in the absence of an informative
response, I would suggest that the current state of affairs is the inevitable
result of subordinating the rights of the voting public to the prerogatives of
State Security Bureaus. The surest way for any nation to become subject to
unnecessary surveillance is to allow its spies to dictate its policy.
The right to be free unwarranted intrusion into our private
effects – our lives and possessions, our thoughts and communications – is a
human right. It is not granted by national governments and it cannot be revoked
by them out of convenience. Just as we do not allow police officers to enter
every home to fish around for evidence of undiscovered crimes, we must not
allow spies to rummage through our every communication for indications of
disfavored activities.
Could you comment on the activities of EU Member States
intelligence agencies in these operations and how advanced their capabilities
have become in comparison with the NSA?
The best testimony I can provide on this matter without
pre-empting the work of journalists is to point to the indications that the NSA
not only enables and guides, but shares some mass surveillance systems and
technologies with the agencies of EU member states. As it pertains to the issue
of mass surveillance, the difference between, for example, the NSA and FRA is
not one of technology, but rather funding and manpower. Technology is agnostic
of nationality, and the flag on the pole outside of the building makes systems
of mass surveillance no more or less effective.
In terms of the mass surveillance programmes already revealed
through the press, what proportion of the mass surveillance activities do these
programmes account for? Are there many other programmes, undisclosed as of yet,
that would impact on EU citizens rights?
There are many other undisclosed programs that would impact EU
citizens' rights, but I will leave the public interest determinations as to
which of these may be safely disclosed to responsible journalists in
coordination with government stakeholders.
– Shadow Rapporteur Sophie Int'Veld MEP, ALDE Group:
Are there adequate procedures in the NSA for staff to signal
wrongdoing?
Unfortunately not. The culture within the US Intelligence
Community is such that reporting serious concerns about the legality or
propriety of programs is much more likely to result in your being flagged as a
troublemaker than to result in substantive reform. We should remember that many
of these programs were well known to be problematic to the legal offices of
agencies such as the GCHQ and other oversight officials. According to their own
documents, the priority of the overseers is not to assure strict compliance
with the law and accountability for violations of law, but rather to avoid, and
I quote, "damaging public debate," to conceal the fact that
for-profit companies have gone "well beyond" what is legally required
of them, and to avoid legal review of questionable programs by open courts. In
my personal experience, repeatedly raising concerns about legal and policy
matters with my co-workers and superiors resulted in two kinds of responses.
The first were well-meaning but hushed warnings not to "rock
the boat," for fear of the sort of retaliation that befell former NSA
whistleblowers like Wiebe, Binney, and Drake. All three men reported their
concerns through the official, approved process, and all three men were subject
to armed raids by the FBI and threats of criminal sanction. Everyone in the
Intelligence Community is aware of what happens to people who report concerns
about unlawful but authorized operations.
The second were similarly well-meaning but more pointed
suggestions, typically from senior officials, that we should let the issue be
someone else's problem. Even among the most senior individuals to whom I
reported my concerns, no one at NSA could ever recall an instance where an
official complaint had resulted in an unlawful program being ended, but there
was a unanimous desire to avoid being associated with such a complaint in any
form.
Do you feel you had exhausted all avenues before taking the
decision to go public?
Yes. I had reported these clearly problematic programs to more
than ten distinct officials, none of whom took any action to address them. As
an employee of a private company rather than a direct employee of the US government,
I was not protected by US whistleblower laws, and I would not have been
protected from retaliation and legal sanction for revealing classified
information about lawbreaking in accordance with the recommended process.
It is important to remember that this is legal dilemma did not
occur by mistake. US whistleblower reform laws were passed as recently as 2012,
with the US Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, but they specifically
chose to exclude Intelligence Agencies from being covered by the statute.
President Obama also reformed a key executive Whistleblower regulation with his
2012 Presidential Policy Directive 19, but it exempted Intelligence Community
contractors such as myself. The result was that individuals like me were left
with no proper channels.
Do you think procedures for whistleblowing have been improved now?
No. There has not yet been any substantive whistleblower reform in
the US, and unfortunately my government has taken a number of disproportionate
and persecutory actions against me. US government officials have declared me
guilty of crimes in advance of any trial, they've called for me to be executed
or assassinated in private and openly in the press, they revoked my passport
and left me stranded in a foreign transit zone for six weeks, and even used
NATO to ground the presidential plane of Evo Morales – the leader of Bolivia –
on hearing that I might attempt to seek and enjoy asylum in Latin America.
What is your relationship with the Russian and Chinese
authorities, and what are the terms on which you were allowed to stay
originally in Hong Kong and now in Russia?
I have no relationship with either government.
– Shadow Rapporteur Jan Philipp Albrecht MEP, Greens Group:
Could we help you in any way, and do you seek asylum in the EU?
If you want to help me, help me by helping everyone: declare that
the indiscriminate, bulk collection of private data by governments is a
violation of our rights and must end. What happens to me as a person is less
important than what happens to our common rights.
As for asylum, I do seek EU asylum, but I have yet to receive a
positive response to the requests I sent to various EU member states.
Parliamentarians in the national governments have told me that the US, and I
quote, "will not allow" EU partners to offer political asylum to me,
which is why the previous resolution on asylum ran into such mysterious
opposition. I would welcome any offer of safe passage or permanent asylum, but
I recognize that would require an act of extraordinary political courage.
Can you confirm cyber-attacks by the NSA or other intelligence
agencies on EU institutions, telecommunications providers such as Belgacom and
SWIFT, or any other EU-based companies?
Yes. I don't want to outpace the efforts of journalists, here, but
I can confirm that all documents reported thus far are authentic and
unmodified, meaning the alleged operations against Belgacom, SWIFT, the EU as
an institution, the United Nations, UNICEF, and others based on documents I
provided have actually occurred. And I expect similar operations will be
revealed in the future that affect many more ordinary citizens.
– Shadow Rapporteur Cornelia Ernst MEP, GUE Group:
In your view, how far can the surveillance measures you revealed
be justified by national security and from your experience is the information
being used for economic espionage? What could be done to resolve this?
Surveillance against specific targets, for unquestionable reasons
of national security while respecting human rights, is above reproach.
Unfortunately, we've seen a growth in untargeted, extremely questionable
surveillance for reasons entirely unrelated to national security. Most
recently, the Prime Minister of Australia, caught red-handed engaging in the
most blatant kind of economic espionage, sought to argue that the price of
Indonesian shrimp and clove cigarettes was a "security matter." These
are indications of a growing disinterest among governments for ensuring
intelligence activities are justified, proportionate, and above all
accountable. We should be concerned about the precedent our actions set.
The UK's GCHQ is the prime example of this, due to what they refer
to as a "light oversight regime," which is a bureaucratic way of
saying their spying activities are less restricted than is proper. Since that
light oversight regime was revealed, we have learned that the GCHQ is
intercepting and storing unprecedented quantities of ordinary citizens'
communications on a constant basis, both within the EU and without. There is no
argument that could convince an open court that such activities were necessary
and proportionate, and it is for this reason that such activities are shielded
from the review of open courts.
In the United States, we use a secret, rubber-stamp Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court that only hears arguments from the government.
Out of approximately 34,000 government requests over 33 years, the secret court
rejected only 11. It should raise serious concerns for this committee, and for
society, that the GCHQ's lawyers consider themselves fortunate to avoid the
kind of burdensome oversight regime that rejects 11 out of 34,000 requests. If
that's what heavy oversight looks like, what, pray tell, does the GCHQ's
"light oversight" look like?
Let's explore it. We learned only days ago that the GCHQ
compromised a popular Yahoo service to collect images from web cameras inside
citizens' homes, and around 10% of these images they take from within people's
homes involve nudity or intimate activities. In the same report, journalists
revealed that this sort of webcam data was searchable via the NSA's XKEYSCORE
system, which means the GCHQ's "light oversight regime" was used not
only to capture bulk data that is clearly of limited intelligence value and
most probably violates EU laws, but to then trade that data with foreign
services without the knowledge or consent of any country's voting public.
We also learned last year that some of the partners with which the
GCHQ was sharing this information, in this example the NSA, had made efforts to
use evidence of religious conservatives' association with sexually explicit
material of the sort GCHQ was collecting as a grounds for destroying their
reputations and discrediting them. The "Release to Five Eyes"
classification of this particular report, dated 2012, reveals that the UK
government was aware of the NSA's intent to use sexually explicit material in
this manner, indicating a deepening and increasingly aggressive partnership.
None of these religious conservatives were suspected of involvement in
terrorist plots: they were targeted on the basis of their political beliefs and
activism, as part of a class the NSA refers to as "radicalizers."
I wonder if any members of this committee have ever advocated a
position that the NSA, GCHQ, or even the intelligence services of an EU member
state might attempt to construe as "radical"? If you were targeted on
the basis of your political beliefs, would you know? If they sought to
discredit you on the basis of your private communications, could you discover
the culprit and prove it was them? What would be your recourse?
And you are parliamentarians. Try to imagine the impact of such
activities against ordinary citizens without power, privilege, or resources.
Are these activities necessary, proportionate, and an unquestionable matter of
national security? A few weeks ago we learned the GCHQ has hired scientists to
study how to create divisions amongst activists and disfavored political
groups, how they attempt to discredit and destroy private businesses, and how
they knowingly plant false information to misdirect civil discourse.
To directly answer your question, yes, global surveillance
capabilities are being used on a daily basis for the purpose of economic
espionage. That a major goal of the US Intelligence Community is to produce
economic intelligence is the worst kept secret in Washington.
In September, we learned the NSA had successfully targeted and
compromised the world's major financial transaction facilitators, such as Visa
and SWIFT, which released documents describe as providing "rich personal
information," even data that "is not about our targets". Again,
these documents are authentic and unmodified – a fact the NSA itself has never
once disputed.
In August, we learned the NSA had targeted Petrobras, an energy
company brazilian-oil-giant. It would be the first of a long list of US energy
targets. But we should be clear these activities are not unique to the NSA or
GCHQ. Australia's DSD targeted Sri Mulyani Indrawati, a finance minister and
Managing Director of the World Bank. Report after report has revealed targeting
of G-8 and G-20 summits. Mass surveillance capabilities have even been used against
a climate change summit.
Recently, governments have shifted their talking points from
claiming they only use mass surveillance for "national security"
purposes to the more nebulous "valid foreign intelligence purposes."
I suggest this committee consider that this rhetorical shift is a tacit
acknowledgment by governments that they recognize they have crossed beyond the
boundaries of justifiable activities. Every country believes its "foreign
intelligence purposes" are "valid," but that does not make it
so. If we are prepared to condemn the economic spying of our competitors, we
must be prepared to do the same of our allies. Lasting peace is founded upon
fundamental fairness.
The international community must agree to common standards of
behavior, and jointly invest in the development of new technical standards to
defend against mass surveillance. We rely on common systems, and the French
will not be safe from mass surveillance until Americans, Argentines, and
Chinese are as well.
The good news is that there are solutions. The weakness of mass
surveillance is that it can very easily be made much more expensive through
changes in technical standards: pervasive, end-to-end encryption can quickly
make indiscriminate surveillance impossible on a cost-effective basis. The
result is that governments are likely to fall back to traditional, targeted
surveillance founded upon an individualized suspicion. Governments cannot risk
the discovery of their exploits by simply throwing attacks at every
"endpoint," or computer processor on the end of a network connection,
in the world. Mass surveillance, passive surveillance, relies upon unencrypted
or weakly encrypted communications at the global network level.
If there had been better independent and public oversight over the
intelligence agencies, do you think this could have prevented this kind of mass
surveillance? What conditions would need to be fulfilled, both nationally and
internationally?
Yes, better oversight could have prevented the mistakes that
brought us to this point, as could an understanding that defense is always more
important than offense when it comes to matters of national intelligence. The
intentional weakening of the common security standards upon which we all rely
is an action taken against the public good.
The oversight of intelligence agencies should always be performed
by opposition parties, as under the democratic model, they always have the most
to lose under a surveillance state. Additionally, we need better whistleblower
protections, and a new commitment to the importance of international asylum.
These are important safeguards that protect our collective human rights when
the laws of national governments have failed.
European governments, which have traditionally been champions of
human rights, should not be intimidated out of standing for the right of asylum
against political charges, of which espionage has always been the traditional
example. Journalism is not a crime, it is the foundation of free and informed
societies, and no nation should look to others to bear the burden of defending
its rights. Shadow Rapporteur Axel Voss MEP, EPP Group
Why did you choose to go public with your information?
Secret laws and secret courts cannot authorize unconstitutional
activities by fiat, nor can classification be used to shield an unjustified and
embarrassing violation of human rights from democratic accountability. If the
mass surveillance of an innocent public is to occur, it should be authorized as
the result of an informed debate with the consent of the public, under a
framework of laws that the government invites civil society to challenge in
open courts.
That our governments are even today unwilling to allow independent
review of the secret policies enabling mass surveillance of innocents
underlines governments' lack of faith that these programs are lawful, and this
provides stronger testimony in favor of the rightfulness of my actions than any
words I might write.
Did you exhaust all possibilities before taking the decision to go
public?
Yes. I had reported these clearly problematic programs to more
than ten distinct officials, none of whom took any action to address them. As
an employee of a private company rather than a direct employee of the US
government, I was not protected by US whistleblower laws, and I would not have
been protected from retaliation and legal sanction for revealing classified information
about lawbreaking in accordance with the recommended process.
It is important to remember that this is legal dilemma did not
occur by mistake. US whistleblower reform laws were passed as recently as 2012,
with the US Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, but they specifically
chose to exclude Intelligence Agencies from being covered by the statute.
President Obama also reformed a key executive Whistleblower regulation with his
2012 Presidential Policy Directive 19, but it exempted Intelligence Community
contractors such as myself. The result was that individuals like me were left
with no proper channels.
Are you aware that your revelations have the potential to put at
risk lives of innocents and hamper efforts in the global fight against terrorism?
Actually, no specific evidence has ever been offered, by any
government, that even a single life has been put at risk by the award-winning
journalism this question attempts to implicate.
The ongoing revelations about unlawful and improper surveillance
are the product of a partnership between the world's leading journalistic
outfits and national governments, and if you can show one of the governments
consulted on these stories chose not to impede demonstrably fatal information
from being published, I invite you to do so. The front page of every newspaper
in the world stands open to you.
Did the Russian secret service approach you?
Of course. Even the secret service of Andorra would have
approached me, if they had had the chance: that's their job.
But I didn't take any documents with me from Hong Kong, and while
I'm sure they were disappointed, it doesn't take long for an intelligence
service to realize when they're out of luck. I was also accompanied at all
times by an utterly fearless journalist with one of the biggest megaphones in
the world, which is the equivalent of Kryptonite for spies. As a consequence,
we spent the next 40 days trapped in an airport instead of sleeping on piles of
money while waiting for the next parade. But we walked out with heads held
high.
I would also add, for the record, that the United States
government has repeatedly acknowledged that there is no evidence at all of any
relationship between myself and the Russian intelligence service.
Who is currently financing your life?
I am.
– Shadow Rapporteur, Timothy Kirkhope MEP, ECR Group:
You have stated previously that you want the intelligence agencies
to be more accountable to citizens, however, why do you feel this
accountability does not apply to you? Do you therefore, plan to return to the
United States or Europe to face criminal charges and answer questions in an
official capacity, and pursue the route as an official whistle-blower?
Respectfully, I remind you that accountability cannot exist
without the due process of law, and even Deutsche Welle has written about the
well-known gap in US law that deprived me of vital legal protections due to
nothing more meaningful than my status as an employee of a private company
rather than of the government directly. Surely no one on the committee believes
that the measure of one's political rights should be determined by their
employer.
Fortunately, we live in a global, interconnected world where, when
national laws fail like this, our international laws provide for another level
of accountability, and the asylum process provides a means of due process for
individuals who might otherwise be wrongly deprived of it. In the face of the
extraordinary campaign of persecution brought against me by my the United
States government on account of my political beliefs, which I remind you
included the grounding of the President of Bolivia's plane by EU Member States,
an increasing number of national governments have agreed that a grant of
political asylum is lawful and appropriate.
Polling of public opinion in Europe indicates I am not alone in
hoping to see EU governments agree that blowing the whistle on serious
wrongdoing should be a protected act.
Do you still plan to release more files, and have you disclosed or
been asked to disclose any information regarding the content of these files to
Chinese and Russian authorities or any names contained within them?
As stated previously, there are many other undisclosed programs
that would impact EU citizens' rights, but I will leave the public interest
determinations as to which of these may be safely disclosed to responsible
journalists in coordination with government stakeholders. I have not disclosed
any information to anyone other than those responsible journalists. Thank you.
[source: WORLD NEWS DAILY Information Clearing House
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