Questions raised following Cheonan announcement
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작성자 The Hankyorae 작성일10-05-20 23:11 조회1,392회 댓글0건관련링크
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The huge security breach and torpedo markings have both caused experts to raise questions about the investigation findings released Thursday
The joint civilian-military investigation team on Thursday presented propeller fragments from a North Korean torpedo as conclusive evidence as to the cause of the sinking of the Cheonan. A number of questions remain, however, such as why no North Korean submarine was discovered after the Cheonan was attacked.
Stealth Submarine?
The investigation team said that a North Korean Sango Class Submarine and Yono Class Submarine had left a naval base on the West Sea some two to three days prior to the attack and returned to base two to three days after the attack. They determined that the Yono Class Submarine carried out the attack.
A Sango, Shark Class Submarine, weighs 300 tons, while a Yono, Salmon Class Submarine, weighs 130 tons.
Until now, military officials have been saying they did not detect any unusual military movements from North Korea.
“From March 24 to 27, the military detected two North Korean Sango Class Submarines, but the likelihood of their connection to the sinking was judged to be weak.” said Defense Minister Kim Tae-young before the National Assembly on April 2.
“We have not detected any unusual movements from the North Korean military,” said U.S. Combined Forces Command Commander General Walter Sharp through a press release on March 28, two days after the sinking.
In other words, at the time, the Sango Class Submarine that was detected around the time of the sinking was not believed to be directly connected with the sinking, while the Yono Class Submarine was not detected at all.
The investigation team confirmed that around the time of the attack, they had been unable to clearly identify the submarines that had left the base. A military intelligence official said later, through comprehensive analysis of all sorts of intelligence material, including communication intercepts, video footage and human intelligence, they belatedly learned that a Yono Class Midget Submarine had left with its mother ship.
This explanation, however, failed to clarify all questions. A joint South Korean-U.S. naval exercise involving several Aegis warships was underway at the time, and the Cheonan was a patrol combat corvette (PCC) that specialized in anti-submarine warfare. The question remains whether it would be possible for a North Korean submarine to infiltrate the maritime cordon at a time when security reached its tightest level and without detection by the Cheonan.
“If the North Koreans were to try an ambush in revenge for the Daecheong Island naval clash, they would have done so only after they were certain of success following several infiltration exercises in the waters off Baengnyeong Island,” said a former Navy admiral. “The investigation team announcement basically stated that North Korea had planned an attack with a low probability of success on paper and successfully carried it out on one attempt, but that assessment lacks military credibility.”
In fact, if things transpired as the investigation team announced, then a North Korean submarine penetrated the South Korean-U.S. surveillance net, waited precisely where the Cheonan would be approaching, sank the Cheonan in one shot, and then leisurely disappeared after completely avoiding a naval anti-submarine net that included the Naval ship Sokcho and Linx helicopters.
Some have stated that while it was possible the Cheonan was unable to detect the submarine, it remains difficult to understand how it could not detect the torpedo launch.
“A submarine is supposed to be difficult to detect military, but most torpedoes can be detected,” said Kim Jong-dae, editor-in-chief of defense journal D&D Focus. “It is doubtful they would have been completely unable to detect the launch.”
One military official explained they were unable to detect the torpedo since the one used in the attack had a different audio range from those ascertained by the South Korean military, but some respond that it is difficult to understand why they would not have the audio information contained even in brochures regarding a torpedo that has been produced since the 1980s. Accordingly, in order to clear up these doubts, some are calling for the military authorities to release the communication intercepts to show the North Korean submarine‘s intent to attack. The investigation team, however, has reportedly been unable to secure intelligence data that would confirm clearly the circumstances of the attack besides the fact that the Yono Class Submarine left its base in North Korea.
Torpedo Fragment?
There are also some questions regarding the North Korean torpedo fragment, which was presented as conclusive evidence. First, some experts stated that the marking 1 beon, No. 1, presented as key evidence that it was a North Korean torpedo, is different from typical North Korean markings.
“North Korea does not frequently use the term beon,” said one North Korea expert. “Instead, they use the term ho, as in Daepodong 1-ho, Gangnam 1-ho, etc.”
In fact, a North Korean training torpedo obtained by the South Korean military seven years ago was marked “4 ho.” In light of the fact that the beon discovered on the torpedo fragment and the ho found on the training torpedo are different, the investigation team could not have conducted a precise handwriting analysis. The team said it would consider a plan to determine the similarity through ink analysis, but it is uncertain whether a clear answer will result.
Both appear to have been written by hand inside the torpedo for organization and maintenance purposes, but why one is beon and the other ho is a question.
The joint civilian-military investigation team on Thursday presented propeller fragments from a North Korean torpedo as conclusive evidence as to the cause of the sinking of the Cheonan. A number of questions remain, however, such as why no North Korean submarine was discovered after the Cheonan was attacked.
Stealth Submarine?
The investigation team said that a North Korean Sango Class Submarine and Yono Class Submarine had left a naval base on the West Sea some two to three days prior to the attack and returned to base two to three days after the attack. They determined that the Yono Class Submarine carried out the attack.
A Sango, Shark Class Submarine, weighs 300 tons, while a Yono, Salmon Class Submarine, weighs 130 tons.
Until now, military officials have been saying they did not detect any unusual military movements from North Korea.
“From March 24 to 27, the military detected two North Korean Sango Class Submarines, but the likelihood of their connection to the sinking was judged to be weak.” said Defense Minister Kim Tae-young before the National Assembly on April 2.
“We have not detected any unusual movements from the North Korean military,” said U.S. Combined Forces Command Commander General Walter Sharp through a press release on March 28, two days after the sinking.
In other words, at the time, the Sango Class Submarine that was detected around the time of the sinking was not believed to be directly connected with the sinking, while the Yono Class Submarine was not detected at all.
The investigation team confirmed that around the time of the attack, they had been unable to clearly identify the submarines that had left the base. A military intelligence official said later, through comprehensive analysis of all sorts of intelligence material, including communication intercepts, video footage and human intelligence, they belatedly learned that a Yono Class Midget Submarine had left with its mother ship.
This explanation, however, failed to clarify all questions. A joint South Korean-U.S. naval exercise involving several Aegis warships was underway at the time, and the Cheonan was a patrol combat corvette (PCC) that specialized in anti-submarine warfare. The question remains whether it would be possible for a North Korean submarine to infiltrate the maritime cordon at a time when security reached its tightest level and without detection by the Cheonan.
“If the North Koreans were to try an ambush in revenge for the Daecheong Island naval clash, they would have done so only after they were certain of success following several infiltration exercises in the waters off Baengnyeong Island,” said a former Navy admiral. “The investigation team announcement basically stated that North Korea had planned an attack with a low probability of success on paper and successfully carried it out on one attempt, but that assessment lacks military credibility.”
In fact, if things transpired as the investigation team announced, then a North Korean submarine penetrated the South Korean-U.S. surveillance net, waited precisely where the Cheonan would be approaching, sank the Cheonan in one shot, and then leisurely disappeared after completely avoiding a naval anti-submarine net that included the Naval ship Sokcho and Linx helicopters.
Some have stated that while it was possible the Cheonan was unable to detect the submarine, it remains difficult to understand how it could not detect the torpedo launch.
“A submarine is supposed to be difficult to detect military, but most torpedoes can be detected,” said Kim Jong-dae, editor-in-chief of defense journal D&D Focus. “It is doubtful they would have been completely unable to detect the launch.”
One military official explained they were unable to detect the torpedo since the one used in the attack had a different audio range from those ascertained by the South Korean military, but some respond that it is difficult to understand why they would not have the audio information contained even in brochures regarding a torpedo that has been produced since the 1980s. Accordingly, in order to clear up these doubts, some are calling for the military authorities to release the communication intercepts to show the North Korean submarine‘s intent to attack. The investigation team, however, has reportedly been unable to secure intelligence data that would confirm clearly the circumstances of the attack besides the fact that the Yono Class Submarine left its base in North Korea.
Torpedo Fragment?
There are also some questions regarding the North Korean torpedo fragment, which was presented as conclusive evidence. First, some experts stated that the marking 1 beon, No. 1, presented as key evidence that it was a North Korean torpedo, is different from typical North Korean markings.
“North Korea does not frequently use the term beon,” said one North Korea expert. “Instead, they use the term ho, as in Daepodong 1-ho, Gangnam 1-ho, etc.”
In fact, a North Korean training torpedo obtained by the South Korean military seven years ago was marked “4 ho.” In light of the fact that the beon discovered on the torpedo fragment and the ho found on the training torpedo are different, the investigation team could not have conducted a precise handwriting analysis. The team said it would consider a plan to determine the similarity through ink analysis, but it is uncertain whether a clear answer will result.
Both appear to have been written by hand inside the torpedo for organization and maintenance purposes, but why one is beon and the other ho is a question.
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