Inter-Korean relations policy has suffered from two years gap
페이지 정보
작성자 The Hankyorae 작성일10-03-04 14:37 조회2,115회 댓글0건관련링크
본문
Experts say a lack of leadership and policy coordination has resulted in a situation-based allopathy
The Hankyoreh created this series to evaluate the first two years of the Lee presidency through Feb. 25, the two-year anniversary of his inauguration. Over the past two years, the South Korean people have witnessed the regression of democracy and deteriorating inter-Korean relations. Thus, the Hankyoreh will attempt to analyze the impact of the Lee administration‘s policies and give a critique about what the administration should do in the remaining three years. This is part ten of the series.
<##IMAGE##> On April 19, 2008, President Lee Myung-bak met with then-U.S. president George W. Bush, and the two agreed to upgrade the South Korea-U.S. alliance into a “21st Century Strategic Alliance.” A month or so later, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang dealt a direct blow to the Lee administration’s emphasis on the U.S. alliance by calling the alliance “a relic of a history that has already passed by.”
On Nov. 21, 2008, the Lee administration voted in favor of a North Korean human rights resolution at the 63rd United Nations General Assembly, calling human rights “a universal value of humankind,” but abstained from voting on an Iran human rights resolution out of “petroleum diplomacy” considerations. In his 2009 New Year’s address, President Lee proposed an inter-Korean dialogue, stating that he was “ready to cooperate with North Korea as a partner at any time.” But on Jan. 13 of that year, the North Korean Army General Staff dismissed the suggestion, saying that because South Korea “is carrying foreign powers on its back and has opted for the path of confrontation, we will inevitably enter a posture of full-scale confrontation.”
Such cases have been a frequent occurrence during the two years of the Lee administration. While the administration has espoused the principles of restoring the South Korea-U.S. alliance and improving North Korean human rights, the result has been a policy failure that has lost its justification and missed opportunities for the national good.
From where does this policy confusion stem? Analysts say it is the result of a fixation on the neoconservative approach of giving priority and privledge to the U.S. alliance alone and disparaging discussions with North Korea as “lost initiative.”
An analysis of the Lee administration’s foreign policy over the past two years released recently by People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy’s (PSPD) Center for Peace and Disarmament said that “the high-pressure and unilateral approach is reminiscent of the early Bush administration.” The analysis went on to state, “The policy vein of helping North Korea integrate into the international community if it abandons its nuclear program in a verifiable way gives no consideration for the causes or context that have sustained the complexity of the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear issue.”
Another reason experts are citing for this policy confusion is the disappearance of a “control tower” for analyzing and fine-tuning policy directions and repercussions from a variety of angles. In particular, many are saying that there is no visible coordination function for appropriately controlling the “principles” of the Foreign Ministry, which is strongly biased towards the U.S. and views inter-Korean relations as a subordinate variable to international relations, and comprehensively reflects North Korea’s position as a party for participating in dialogue. In other words, there is no “key figure” like Lim Dong-won for the Kim Dae-jung administration or Lee Jong-seok for the Roh Moo-hyun administration.
An expert at one private research institution said, “The biggest problem with the current administration’s foreign policy and national security line is that it is made up only of people with an international view and none with a regional view, so that inter-Korean relations have been excessively neglected.”
Another expert who held a senior position within the Roh administration summed up the situation by saying, “Because overall leadership is lacking and policy coordination functions are inadequate, they persist in a method of situation-based allopathy.”
As an excessive focus is put upon meager “principles,” another policy line the Lee administration has emphasized, that of “pragmatism,” is also losing its bearings. During a press conference with Great Britain’s BBC network on Jan. 29, President Lee himself raised the possibility of a 2010 summit meeting, saying, “I think I may be able to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-il within the year.” But ten days later, at working-level talks on the Mt. Kumgang tourism project, there were no signs of any active efforts toward reaching a point of compromise.
Hankyoreh Peace Research Institute head Kim Yeon-cheol said, “This approach of speaking only of what can be received and not of what can be given cannot be seen as the approach of someone entering negotiations.” In other words, if the Lee administration would like to avoid yet another policy failure, it must show a sincere intent to improve inter-Korean relations as much as it applies pressure on North Korea to make concessions.
The Hankyoreh created this series to evaluate the first two years of the Lee presidency through Feb. 25, the two-year anniversary of his inauguration. Over the past two years, the South Korean people have witnessed the regression of democracy and deteriorating inter-Korean relations. Thus, the Hankyoreh will attempt to analyze the impact of the Lee administration‘s policies and give a critique about what the administration should do in the remaining three years. This is part ten of the series.
<##IMAGE##> On April 19, 2008, President Lee Myung-bak met with then-U.S. president George W. Bush, and the two agreed to upgrade the South Korea-U.S. alliance into a “21st Century Strategic Alliance.” A month or so later, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang dealt a direct blow to the Lee administration’s emphasis on the U.S. alliance by calling the alliance “a relic of a history that has already passed by.”
On Nov. 21, 2008, the Lee administration voted in favor of a North Korean human rights resolution at the 63rd United Nations General Assembly, calling human rights “a universal value of humankind,” but abstained from voting on an Iran human rights resolution out of “petroleum diplomacy” considerations. In his 2009 New Year’s address, President Lee proposed an inter-Korean dialogue, stating that he was “ready to cooperate with North Korea as a partner at any time.” But on Jan. 13 of that year, the North Korean Army General Staff dismissed the suggestion, saying that because South Korea “is carrying foreign powers on its back and has opted for the path of confrontation, we will inevitably enter a posture of full-scale confrontation.”
Such cases have been a frequent occurrence during the two years of the Lee administration. While the administration has espoused the principles of restoring the South Korea-U.S. alliance and improving North Korean human rights, the result has been a policy failure that has lost its justification and missed opportunities for the national good.
From where does this policy confusion stem? Analysts say it is the result of a fixation on the neoconservative approach of giving priority and privledge to the U.S. alliance alone and disparaging discussions with North Korea as “lost initiative.”
An analysis of the Lee administration’s foreign policy over the past two years released recently by People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy’s (PSPD) Center for Peace and Disarmament said that “the high-pressure and unilateral approach is reminiscent of the early Bush administration.” The analysis went on to state, “The policy vein of helping North Korea integrate into the international community if it abandons its nuclear program in a verifiable way gives no consideration for the causes or context that have sustained the complexity of the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear issue.”
Another reason experts are citing for this policy confusion is the disappearance of a “control tower” for analyzing and fine-tuning policy directions and repercussions from a variety of angles. In particular, many are saying that there is no visible coordination function for appropriately controlling the “principles” of the Foreign Ministry, which is strongly biased towards the U.S. and views inter-Korean relations as a subordinate variable to international relations, and comprehensively reflects North Korea’s position as a party for participating in dialogue. In other words, there is no “key figure” like Lim Dong-won for the Kim Dae-jung administration or Lee Jong-seok for the Roh Moo-hyun administration.
An expert at one private research institution said, “The biggest problem with the current administration’s foreign policy and national security line is that it is made up only of people with an international view and none with a regional view, so that inter-Korean relations have been excessively neglected.”
Another expert who held a senior position within the Roh administration summed up the situation by saying, “Because overall leadership is lacking and policy coordination functions are inadequate, they persist in a method of situation-based allopathy.”
As an excessive focus is put upon meager “principles,” another policy line the Lee administration has emphasized, that of “pragmatism,” is also losing its bearings. During a press conference with Great Britain’s BBC network on Jan. 29, President Lee himself raised the possibility of a 2010 summit meeting, saying, “I think I may be able to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-il within the year.” But ten days later, at working-level talks on the Mt. Kumgang tourism project, there were no signs of any active efforts toward reaching a point of compromise.
Hankyoreh Peace Research Institute head Kim Yeon-cheol said, “This approach of speaking only of what can be received and not of what can be given cannot be seen as the approach of someone entering negotiations.” In other words, if the Lee administration would like to avoid yet another policy failure, it must show a sincere intent to improve inter-Korean relations as much as it applies pressure on North Korea to make concessions.
댓글목록
등록된 댓글이 없습니다.
![[부고]노길남 박사](https://minjok.com:443/img/roh008_202.jpg)
